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Casenote

The Decline and Fall of Constructive Notice

I.

INTRODUCTION

Georgia law is well settled that an improperly attested deed does not
provide constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers' of
property interests, even if the defective deed appears in the county
registry.2 Nevertheless, there has been confusion over whether a
properly attested document filed and recorded contemporaneously with
an improperly attested security deed would provide constructive notice,
preventing a bankruptcy trustee from using his or her strong-arm
power' to avoid the security deed.' In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.

1. A bona fide purchaser is a purchaser who has bought property in good faith without
notice of prior adverse claims. Generally, this purchaser has a superior right to the
property as against the seller's creditors "to the extent of the consideration that the
purchaser has paid." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (9th ed. 2009).
2. See, e.g., In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. 160, 162-63 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) ("Under Georgia
law, a recordation on insufficient attestation is equivalent to no recordation at all and the
recording of an improperly attested deed is a mere nullity.").
3. "Strong-arm power" vests the trustee with the powers of a lien creditor and a
subsequent bona fide purchaser, allowing a trustee to avoid a deed that does not provide
constructive notice. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012). Section 544(a) provides, in part, that
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Gordon (GordonIII),' the Georgia Supreme Court laid this question to
rest once and for all with a resounding "no."6
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Borrowers Denise and Alvina Codrington executed a security deed to
Wells Fargo Bank to convey a subdivision lot. The deed became
available in the Fulton County deed registry on October 13, 2006.'
Denise Codrington, Alvina Codrington, and a notary signed the last page
of the deed, but an unofficial witness did not sign the provided signature
line.' Nothing on the signature page indicates that anyone other than
these three witnessed the deed's execution.? Paragraph 23 of the deed
incorporates the covenants and riders executed by the borrower and
recorded with the security deed into it "as if the rider(s) were a part of
this Security Instrument."'o Immediately thereafter, the deed specifically, and only, incorporates an "ARM Rider.""
Even so, a number of other documents, including a Waiver of
Borrower's Rights, were recorded with the deed.12 Though it was not

[tihe trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable by. . . a bona fide purchaser of real property . .. from the
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that
obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the
time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Gordon v. Terrace Mortg. Co. (In re Hong Ju Kim), 571 F.3d 1342, 1343
(11th Cir. 2009); In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. at 161; U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gordon, 289 Ga.
12, 12, 709 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (2011).

5. 292 Ga. 474, 749 S.E.2d 368 (2013) [hereinafter Gordon III].
6. Id. at 474, 749 S.E.2d at 369.
7. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon, 691 F.3d 1336, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter
Gordon Ill.
8. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 474, 749 S.E.2d at 369.
9. Gordon II, 691 F.3d at 1338.
10. Id. A rider is a document that provides supplemental information or amends a
deed. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1436.
11. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 474, 749 S.E.2d at 369. The adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)
rider is an Adjustable Rate Rider, indexed at page 34 of Deed Book 43672 in the Fulton
County, Georgia deed registry. An ARM is "a mortgage in which the lender can
periodically adjust the mortgage's interest rate in accordance with fluctuations in some
external market index." BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY 1102.
12. Gordon II, 691 F.3d at 1338. The other documents that were filed with the deed
are as follows: Exhibit A describing the property (which was incorporated into the deed on
the second page, not in Paragraph 23), a Planned Unit Development Rider, a Foreclosure
Closing Disclosure, a Closing Attorney's Affidavit, and a Waiver of Borrower's Rights. Id.
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specifically incorporated, the waiver referred to "this deed" a number of
times"3 and stipulated that its provisions "are incorporated into and
made a part of the security deed."" The waiver was signed by all of
the parties who signed the security deed as well as an unofficial
witness."
Denise Codrington filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in June 2008, and
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia
appointed Neil C. Gordon as the bankruptcy trustee.e Gordon sought
to avoid Wells Fargo's interest in the property because, without the
signature of an unofficial witness, the security deed did not comply with
statutory requirements and, thus, could not have been duly recorded. 7
Therefore, the deed did not serve as constructive notice to a subsequent
bona fide purchaser." While Wells Fargo agreed that this was the law
prior to 1995, it argued that the amendment to section 44-14-33 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)" now allowed a deed
with a patent defect to provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona
fide purchaser.20 Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, and the
bankruptcy court denied its motion." Instead, the court entered

13. Id.
14. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 369.
15. Id.
16. Gordon II, 691 F.3d at 1339. A trustee is
[a] person appointed by the U.S. Trustee or elected by creditors or appointed by
a judge to administer the bankruptcy estate during a bankruptcy case. The trustee's duties include (1) collecting and reducing to cash the assets of the estate, (2)
operating the debtor's business with court approval if appropriate to preserve the
value of business assets, (3) examining the debtor at a meeting of creditors, (4)
filing inventories and making periodic reports to the court on the financial
condition of the estate, (5) investigating the debtor's financial affairs, (6)
examining proofs of claims and objecting to improper claims, (7) furnishing
information relating to the bankruptcy to interested parties, and (8) opposing
discharge through bankruptcy, if advisable.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1656.

17. GordonIII, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 369. Gordon used the strong-arm power
provided by 11 U.S.C. § 544 to argue that he should be able to avoid the deed. See supra
note 3.
18. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 369. Georgia law requires two witnesses
to attest to the execution of a deed for real property. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 (2002).
19. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 (2002).
20. Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Codrington), 430 B.R. 287, 292 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2009) [hereinafter Gordon 1]. See infra notes 49, 106.
21. Gordon 1, 430 B.R. at 300. The bankruptcy court concluded that Wells Fargo
misconstrued the amendment by ignoring its distinction between recorded and unrecorded
deeds. See id. at 293.
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judgment as a matter of law for Gordon,22 and the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed."
Wells Fargo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Because it could not find a controlling precedent from
the Georgia Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions
to the Georgia Supreme Court at Gordon's request. To rule on the
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit needed to ascertain whether, under Georgia
law, the attestation of a rider filed with an unattested security deed
would remedy the deed's defective attestation and provide constructive
notice. If not, the Eleventh Circuit inquired whether the appearance of
the security deed and the waiver would put a subsequent hypothetical
bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice.2 4 The Georgia Supreme Court
answered both questions in the negative," leading the Eleventh Circuit
to affirm the district court's judgment for Gordon.26
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Georgia has had a recording system in place since at least 1755.27
One of the main purposes of recording is to provide potential purchasers
with notice that third parties may hold a property interest that could
affect a buyer's ability to attain full title." Recording also protects

22. Id. at 300.
23. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 369.
24. Gordon II, 691 F.3d at 1337. The original text of the certified questions is as
follows:
1. Whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should
be considered "duly filed, recorded and indexed" as required by O.C.G.A. § 44-1433, such that a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser would have
constructive notice when the deed incorporates the covenants, terms, and
provisions of a rider that contains the attestations required by O.C.G.A § 44-14-33
and said rider is filed, recorded, and indexed with the security deed?
2. If the answer to question one (1) is in the negative, whether such a situation
would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry
notice?
Id. at 1347 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33).
25. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 474, 749 S.E.2d at 369.
26. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon, 716 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter
Gordon IV].
27. GEORGE PINDAR & DANIEL F. HINKEL, PINDAR's GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAw AND
PROCEDURE wiTH FORMS § 19:120 (7th ed. 2013). While it was still a royal colony, Georgia
passed an act that required conveyances to be recorded and that recognized a duly recorded
deed's priority over an earlier unrecorded one. Id. This system established a foundation
for the doctrine of constructive notice. Id. The act also referred to a register of records
office, which suggests that deeds were already being recorded at that time. Id.
28. See City Wholesale Co. v. Harper, 100 Ga. App. 151, 155, 110 S.E.2d 561, 564
(1959) (holding that "the sole purpose and effect of recordation of both deeds of bargain and
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third parties who have obtained a property interest when they act in
good faith and without notice."
There are three categories of recording acts in the United States: pure
race, notice, and race-notice.3 0 In pure race states, the first deed filed
in the deed registry trumps those filed later." In notice states, the
party who purchases or lends first and without actual notice of prior
claims prevails over parties who filed earlier claims but with notice; the
time of filing is irrelevant. 32 In race-notice states, the first party who
files without notice of earlier claims has superior title."
Under Georgia's race-notice scheme,' every deed that conveys land
must be recorded with that county's clerk of the superior court." There
is no time limit on recordation, but if two deeds from the same seller
convey the same property, the recorded deed with a later date takes
priority over the earlier unrecorded deed."
Filing a deed puts subsequent bona fide purchasers on constructive
notice of a prior interest in the property." Constructive notice is notice
that the law imputes to bona fide purchasers because they have a duty
to be aware of certain facts or circumstances, including a recorded
deed." Georgia law charges all purchasers of land with constructive
notice of recorded instruments in the land's chain of title.3"

sale and of deeds and bills of sale to secure debt insofar as third parties are concerned, is
to afford such third parties constructive notice of the existence of such deed"); see also
Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S. 428, 434 (1881) (noting that "it is uniformly held that the
registration of a conveyance operates as constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers").
29. Leeds Bldg. Prods. Inc. v. Sears Mortg. Corp., 267 Ga. 300,302,477 S.E.2d 565,568
(1996).
30. See PINDAR & HINKEL, supra note 27, at § 19:131.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See O.C.G.A.

§§

44-2-1 to -4 (2010), 44-14-140 to -144 (2002), 44-14-160 (2002 &

Supp. 2013).
35.

O.C.G.A.

§ 44-2-1.

36. Id. ("Every deed conveying lands shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the
superior court of the county where the land is located. A deed may be recorded at any
time; but a prior unrecorded deed loses its priority over a subsequent recorded deed from
the same vendor when the purchaser takes such deed without notice of the existence of the
prior deed.").
37. Leeds Bldg. Prods.Inc., 267 Ga. at 301, 477 S.E.2d at 567.
38.

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1164.

39. VATACS Grp., Inc. v. HomeSide Lending, Inc., 276 Ga. App. 386, 391, 623 S.E.2d
534,539 (2005) ("Chain of title includes all recorded instruments pertaining to the property
that are executed by an entity holding a recorded interest in the property at the time of
the execution of the instrument.").
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Providing this notice is critical in bankruptcy law. Under 11 U.S.C.

§ 544,40 a Chapter 7 trustee has the power of a lien creditor and a bona
fide purchaser.4 ' The statute also bestows what is commonly known as
strong-arm power," which allows a trustee to avoid interests that are
voidable under applicable law." In Georgia, this means that failure to
provide constructive notice of a security deed allows a Chapter 7 trustee
to avoid it.44

A.

Constructive Notice

It is well settled that a deed with a patent defect is ineligible for
recording, and, thus, such a deed cannot provide constructive notice.
As early as 1852, the Georgia Supreme Court held that "an irregular
registration of a deed[ I is not even notice."' Since that time, countless
decisions have upheld this conclusion.4' The Georgia General Assembly

40. 11 U.S.C. § 544.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
42. See supra note 3.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
44. See Neil C. Gordon & Michael F. Holbein, Avoiding Security Deeds in Bankruptcy
(A Chapter 7 Trustee's Perspective),in 35TH ANNUAL REAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE, at 3
(2013) ("[Tihe trustee's strong-arm powers may also be used to avoid a deed that is actually
recorded in the proper county, indexed in the proper book, and clearly visible on the record,
yet due to a patent defect in attestation, fails to provide constructive notice."); see also In
re Hong Ju Kim, 571 F.3d at 1345 n.3.
45. See, e.g., Gordon v. U.S. Bank, NA. (In re Hagler), 429 B.R. 42,47 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2009); Kilgore v. Buice, 229 Ga. 445, 449, 192 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1972); Citizens Bank of
Moultrie v. Taylor, 169 Ga. 203, 209, 149 S.E. 861, 863 (1929). A patent defect is a defect
that can be seen on the face of the document. In re Hagler, 429 B.R. at 47. Conversely,
a latent defect is not immediately apparent upon inspection. Id.
46. Rushin v. Shields & Ball, 11 Ga. 636, 640 (1852). The Georgia Supreme Court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hodgson v. Butts, 7 U.S. 140, 152
(1805) (noting that when a statute requires two witnesses to a conveyance, "the natural
and only inference is, that if a conveyance is for a consideration deemed valuable in law,
that it must be valid, and transfer property as absolutely as a conveyance for a
consideration not deemed valuable, proved by two witnesses"), as well as decisions from
Pennsylvania, Heister v. Fortner,2 Binn. 40,45 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1809) (holding "that the lessor
of the plaintiff cannot legally be said to have had constructive notice of the deed to the
trustees, though placed on record by them, without having taken the necessary preliminary
steps for that purpose"); Duncan v. Duncan, 1 Watts 322, 329 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1833);
Connecticut, Peck v. Woodbridge, 3 Day 508, 512 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1807); and
Massachusetts, Moody v. Fiske, 17 F. Cas. 655, 657-58 (D. Mass. 1820); Stebbins v.
Jennings,27 Mass. 172 (1830) in adopting this principle into Georgia common law. Rushin,
11 Ga. at 640.
47. See, e.g., In re Hammett, 286 F. 392, 394-95 (N.D. Ga. 1923); Am. Distrib. Co. v.
Reid, 101 Ga. App. 477, 478, 114 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1960).
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codified this rule in the Code of 1860.48 The current statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-33, requires attestation or acknowledgement of a mortgage by
both an official and an unofficial witness. 49 By attesting, the witnesses
certify that they observed the deed's execution.o The clerk of court
may not record an unattested deed in the county's registry."
Higdon v. Gates5 is a recent case often cited for its holding that
patently defective deeds are not eligible for recordation." In that case,
a grantor conveyed the same parcel to two parties, and both successors
in title claimed the property. One party's predecessor received the
property via a warranty deed and the other via a security deed. Though
recorded first, the warranty deed showed that the transfer tax required
by statute for recordation had not been paid. 4 The Georgia Supreme
Court held that failure to pay the transfer tax was a patent defect that
rendered the deed ineligible for recording." The court did not note any
defects on the security deed." Additionally, the court confirmed that
a clerk is not authorized to record a deed that does not comply with
statutory attestation requirements. Furthermore, even if it appears
in the registry, such a deed does not provide constructive notice. 8

48. GEORGIA CODE of 1860 § 1957 (1861), availableat http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/gacode/18 ("No particular form is necessary to constitute a mortgage. It must clearly
indicate the creation of a lien, specify the debt to secure which it is given, and the property
upon which it is to take effect. It must be executed in the presence of, and attested by, or
proved before a Notary Public or Justice of any Court in this State, or a Clerk of the
Superior Court, (and in case of real property by one other witness,) and recorded within
three months from its date.").
49. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 ("In order to admit a mortgage to record, it must be attested
by or acknowledged before an officer as prescribed for the attestation or acknowledgement
of deeds of bargain and sale; and, in the case of real property, a mortgage must also be
attested or acknowledged by one additional witness. In the absence of fraud, if a mortgage
is duly filed, recorded, and indexed on the appropriate county land records, such
recordation shall be deemed constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.") All
statutory requirements for mortgages are also applicable to security deeds. O.C.G.A. § 4414-61 (2002).
50. Gordon III, 292 at 476, 749 S.E.2d at 370 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (5th
ed. 1979)).
51. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33; see alsoHigdon v. Gates, 238 Ga. 105, 107,231 S.E.2d 345,
346 (1976).
52. 238 Ga. 105, 231 S.E.2d 345 (1976).
53. Id. at 107, 231 S.E.2d at 346.
54. Id. at 106-07, 231 S.E.2d at 346 ("Code Ann. § 92-805 provides that no deed of the
kind described in § 92-801 shall be filed for record or recorded unless the transfer tax has
been paid.").
55. Id. at 107, 231 S.E.2d at 346.
56. Id. at 107, 231 S.E.2d at 346-47.
57. Id. at 107, 231 S.E.2d at 346.
58. Id.
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Thus, the warranty deed was not entitled to be recorded due to its
patent defect, and it could not provide constructive notice to subsequent
bona fide purchasers, such as the predecessor in title to the holder of the
security deed." Because the predecessor in title to the holder of the
security deed did not have actual notice of the warranty deed either, the
court held that the security deed was the superior title.6 0
Eleven years later, in In re Fleeman,6 1 the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Middle District of Georgia recognized this longstanding
rule regarding patent defects." There, a security deed that had not
been signed by an unofficial witness was filed with a properly attested
adjustable rate rider." When the borrower filed for bankruptcy, the
trustee sought to avoid the security deed using the strong-arm power
vested by 11 U.S.C. § 5 44 ," claiming that the deed had not been
validly perfected under state law. 5 In an attempt to remedy the
defect, the unofficial witness to the adjustable rate rider executed an
affidavit confirming that she had also observed the debtor sign the
security deed, but she did not do so until six months after the borrower
filed for bankruptcy, which rendered her affidavit ineffective.66
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia
found that the unofficial witness's signature on the adjustable rate rider
only attested to the execution of that document.67 Even though the
adjustable rate rider was incorporated into the terms of the security
deed, the deed itself was still improperly attested and, thus, ineligible
for recording.68 Because the affidavit intended to remedy the defect in
the deed was filed after the bankruptcy case commenced, it was not filed
in time to perfect the lien.69 Accordingly, the deed remained improperly attested and, thus, did not provide constructive notice to a subsequent

59. Id.
60. Id. at 107, 231 S.E.2d at 346-47.
61. 81 B.R. 160 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
62. Id. at 162, 163.
63. Id. at 162.
64. See supra note 3.
65. In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. at 161.
66. Id. at 162, 163; see also infra notes 69, 87.
67. In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. at 163.
68. Id.
69. Id. ("Under section 362(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, after the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, a creditor may not act to perfect a lien against property of the debtor
that secures a claim that arose before the bankruptcy case was commenced."). A patent
defect in a deed may be remedied by filing an affidavit. O.C.G.A. § 44-2-18 (2010).
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bona fide purchaser."o Therefore, the trustee was entitled to avoid
it.7
In 1995, the General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 by
adding a second sentence that puts subsequent bona fide purchasers on
constructive notice of "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" deeds in the
absence of fraud.72 Some may have believed that the General Assembly
meant to reverse existing law and authorize any deeds appearing in the
county registry to serve as constructive notice, regardless of whether
they meet statutory requirements for recordation."
However, the
Georgia Supreme Court has construed the amendment narrowly,
recognizing only constructive notice from deeds with latent defects.74
In contrast to deeds with patent defects, deeds with latent defects do
not provide constructive notice." Latent defects are not apparent on
the face of a deed." Although several early Georgia decisions implied
that latent defects as to statutory attestation requirements destroyed
constructive notice of the deed," the Georgia Supreme Court had never
directly considered the effect of deeds that facially complied with
statutory attestation requirements but were actually defectively attested
until 1996, in Leeds Building Products, Inc. v. Sears Mortgage Corp."
In Leeds Building Products, Inc., the security deeds at issue were not
properly attested because the unofficial witness did not actually observe
the execution of the deeds; instead, she signed them after they had

70. In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. at 163.
71. Id.
72. Ga. H.R. Bill 473, Reg. Sess., 1995 Ga. Laws 1076 § 1 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33).
73. See U.S. Bank Nat'lAss'n, 289 Ga. at 16, 709 S.E.2d at 262 ("Our interpretation of
the 1995 Amendment also is supported by commentators that have considered the issue
.... [Ihf [the commentators] thought that the 1995 Amendment altered longstanding law
with regard to deeds containing facial defects as to attestation, they surely would have said
so."); see also In re Hong Ju Kim, 571 F.3d at 1343 ("First, Terrace contends that the
bankruptcy court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustee because
additional language in [O.C.G.A.] § 44-14-33, added by a 1995 amendment, indicates that,
despite the failure to include a notary seal on the attestation page, the Islecurity [dleed
was sufficiently recorded to provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide
purchaser.").
74. See Leeds Bldg. Prods.Inc., 267 Ga. at 302, 477 S.E.2d at 568.
75. In re Hagler, 429 B.R. at 47. See Leeds Bldg. Prods. Inc., 267 Ga. at 302, 477
S.E.2d at 568.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Baxley v. Baxley, 117 Ga. 60, 61, 62, 43 S.E. 436, 437 (1903); White Co.
v. Magarahan, 87 Ga. 217, 218-19, 221, 13 S.E. 509, 510, 511 (1891); Nichols v. Hampton,
46 Ga. 253, 257 (1872); Propes v. Todd, 89 Ga. App. 308, 312, 79 S.E.2d 346, 350 (1953).
78. 267 Ga. 300, 477 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
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already been executed." Georgia law requires the unofficial witness to
actually be present at a deed's execution," so, the attestation of these
deeds was defective." However, because the deeds facially complied
with the statutory requirements for recordation, the clerk was entitled
Once filed, they provided constructive notice to
to record them.
subsequent bona fide purchasers in spite of their defects." The court
took this opportunity to clarify ambiguous case law and explicitly
overruled any prior cases holding that latently defective attestation
destroyed the constructive notice of an otherwise properly recorded
deed." The court also distinguished Higdon, specifically holding that
its decision in that case, that deeds with patent defects are not eligible
to be recorded, remains good law."
Even though patently defective deeds may not provide constructive
notice, a patent defect is not always fatal to the property interest at
issue. Rather, patent defects may be remedied by filing an affidavit
certifying that an unofficial witness observed the deed's execution.86
On facts similar to In re Fleeman, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Gordon v. Terrace Mortgage Co. (In re
Hong Ju Kim)" that compliance with the remedial provisions in
O.C.G.A. § 44-2-18" cured a patent defect-a missing notary's seal-on
a security deed." This security deed expressly incorporated three
riders that were recorded with it, including a single page containing both
a waiver of borrower's rights and the closing attorney's affidavit. The
notarized and attested waiver stated that its provisions were incorporated into the security deed.o

79. Id.
80. See In re Fleeman, 81 B.R. at 163 ("By attesting a document, an individual signifies
that he has witnessed the execution of the particular document.").
81. Leeds Bldg. Prods. Inc., 267 Ga. at 300, 477 S.E.2d at 567.
82. Id. at 302, 477 S.E.2d at 568.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. O.C.G.A. § 44-2-18 ("If a deed is neither attested by nor acknowledged before one
of the officers named in (O.C.GA. §] 44-2-15, it may be recorded upon the affidavit of a
subscribing witness, which affidavit shall be made before any one of the officers named
in [O.C.G.A. §144-2-15 and shall testify to the execution of the deed and its attestation
according to law. A substantial compliance with the requirements of this Code section
shall be held sufficient in the absence of all suspicion of fraud.").
87. 571 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2009).
88. O.C.G.A. § 44-2-18.
89. In re Hong Ju Kim, 571 F.3d at 1343-44.
90. Id. at 1344. The affidavit confirms that the closing attorney reviewed and
explained the debtor's rights before the security deed and waiver were executed. Id.
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When the borrower filed for bankruptcy, the trustee sought to avoid
the security deed as patently defective because of the missing seal."
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that while the closing attorney's affidavit testified to the
execution of the security deed, it did not testify to the attestation of the
deed, and O.C.G.A. § 44-2-18 requires both.9 2 Thus, the court allowed
the trustee to avoid the deed for lack of constructive notice. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed."
However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the closing
attorney's "[alffidavit either complied, or at a minimum, substantially
The
complied with the remedial provisions of [O.C.G.A.] § 44-2-18.'
court concluded that the closing attorney's affidavit was specifically
incorporated into the security deed." It also deemed the waiver and
the affidavit to be one document instead of two distinct documents
appearing on one page.9 Accordingly, it reasoned that because the
security deed expressly incorporated the waiver, and the waiver
incorporated itself into the security deed, the properly attested affidavit
was also specifically incorporated into the security deed via the waiver
with which it shared a page." The court noted several times that the
affidavit and the security deed's attestation page were only separated by
four pages in the deed book and that the two were filed contemporaneously."
The court found the trustee's argument that the affidavit does not
contain a legal property description or identify the security deed to
which it refers frivolous." It determined that a subsequent bona fide
purchaser examining the title would be aware of this lien because "the
Affidavit is part of the last page of the Security Instrument, a single
document consisting of the Security Deed and the Riders, recorded
together in the deed book. It is obvious that the Affidavit is referring
specifically to the Security Deed at issue in this case." 00 In other
words, the court concluded that the deed provided constructive notice

91. Id.
92. Id. at 1346.
93. Id. at 1344.
94. Id. at 1344, 1347; see also supra note 87. It was not necessary for the court to
construe the language added to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 in 1995 because it used O.C.G.A. § 442-18 to remedy the defect instead. In re Hong Ju Kim, 571 F.3d at 1343-44.
95. In re Hong Ju Kim, 571 F.3d at 1346.
96. Id. at 1346 & n.6.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1346, 1347 & nn.6 & 8.
99. Id. at 1347 n.8.
100. Id. at 1347 & n.8.
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because the security deed incorporated the attested rider, which
remedied the patent defect by substantially complying with O.C.G.A.
§ 44-2-18.'02 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments of the lower
courts and remanded with an order for the lower court to enter summary
judgment in favor of the mortgage company.'0 o
Three years later in 2011, in United States Bank National Ass'n v.
Gordon,'03 the Georgia Supreme Court revisited attestation and the
The court addressed
1995 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33.'0
whether the amended O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 should be construed to mean
that, in the absence of fraud, a security deed that has not been attested
by an official or an unofficial witness, but has nevertheless been actually
filed, recorded, and accurately indexed in the correct county's land
records, provides constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.' 5 The supreme court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Georgia's holding that there was no
constructive notice, reaffirming its holding from Leeds Building

Products,Inc.'or
In holding that there was no constructive notice, the supreme court
noted that O.C.G.A. § 44-14-39107 explicitly provides that an unattested
mortgage does not put subsequent bona fide purchasers on notice.'0o
It reasoned that to provide the requisite constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers, a security deed must be "duly filed,
recorded, and indexed" before it may be admitted to record under
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33.1o9 Simply being in fact filed, recorded, and
0 "Duly" refers to the first sentence of the
indexed is insufficient.o"

101. Id. at 1347.
102. Id.
103. 289 Ga. 12, 709 S.E.2d 258 (2011).
104. Id. at 12, 709 S.E.2d at 259.
105. Id. In 1995, the following sentence was added to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33: "In the
absence of fraud, if a mortgage is duly filed, recorded, and indexed on the appropriate
county land records, such recordation shall be deemed constructive notice to subsequent
bona fide purchasers." O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33.
106. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 289 Ga. at 13, 709 S.E.2d at 260 (holding that "a security
deed with a facially defective attestation would not provide constructive notice, while a
security deed with a facially proper but latently defective attestation would provide
constructive notice").
107. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-39 (2002).
108. U.S. Bank Nat'lAss'n, 289 Ga. at 15, 709 S.E.2d at 261; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-1439 ("A mortgage which is recorded ... without due attestation . . . shall not be held to be
notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers. A mere formal mistake in the record shall not
vitiate it.").
109. U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n, 289 Ga. at 15, 709 S.E.2d at 261.
110. Id. at 14, 709 S.E.2d at 261.
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statute, which requires attestation or acknowledgement by both an
official and an unofficial witness when real property is the subject of the
mortgage."' Furthermore, case law establishes that a deed with
latent defects is eligible for recording, while a deed with patent defects
is not." 2 The court construed the current statutory scheme in accordance with the settled case law, remarking that to hold otherwise would
allow lenders to present improperly attested security deeds for recordation, and clerks would legally be permitted to record them."' Thus,
the clerk's obligation to only record properly attested deeds would
transform from a duty into a suggestion."' This change to the clerk's
responsibilities, in turn, could lead to an increase in fraud because,
without proper attestation, no one would have verified the execution of
the deed before its recordation put the world on notice."i5
Moreover, any other construction would have far-reaching consequences." 6 Both the burden of determining the genuineness of the grantor's
signature, perhaps decades later, and the cost of investigating and
possibly litigating the authenticity of those signatures would shift to
subsequent bona fide purchasers."
The court admonished that "it
costs nothing and requires no special expertise or effort for a closing
attorney, or a lender, or a title insurance company to examine the
signature page of a deed for missing signatures before it is filed.""'

B. Inquiry Notice
Inquiry notice imposes an obligation on subsequent bona fide
purchasers to conduct a reasonable investigation of facts at their
disposal, including property interests referred to in recorded deeds."'

111. Id. at 15, 709 S.E.2d at 261.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 15, 16, 709 S.E.2d at 261, 262.
114. Id. at 16, 709 S.E.2d at 262.
115. Id. at 16-17, 709 S.E.2d at 262.
116. See id. at 17, 709 S.E.2d at 262.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting In re Hagler,429 B.R. at 52).
119. O.C.G.A. § 23-1-17 (1982) ("Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on
inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found that such inquiry
might have led. Ignorance of a fact due to negligence shall be equivalent to knowledge in
fixing the rights of parties."). In 1853, the Georgia Supreme Court observed that
notice is sufficiently actual, which by the proof, either positive or presumptive,
brings home to the purchaser such knowledge of the circumstances, as authorizes
the clear and satisfactory conclusion, that he had notice of the prior incumbrance;
or such as renders proper the conclusion, that he was, or should have been put
upon inquiry.
Jordan v. Pollock, 14 Ga. 145, 157 (1853).
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In 1898, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether a reference to
an unrecorded map in a parcel's legal description put a subsequent bona
fide purchaser on inquiry notice of the contents of that map. 2 0 In
Talmadge Bros. & Co. v. Interstate Building & Loan Ass'n,12 1 the court
construed the inquiry notice statute 22 to indicate that the law presumes
a purchaser is aware of all instruments in the chain of title.123
Furthermore, a purchaser should investigate "every other fact which an
examination suggested by the records would have disclosed."" Thus,
the deed's reference to a map or survey in the legal description
incorporated those documents into the deed, and the purchaser was
charged with notice of their contentS.125
The court also observed that the description of the parcel must be
"reasonably certain and sufficient" to enable subsequent bona fide
purchasers to identify the property being conveyed in an instrument.'26
If the description in the deed is "inaccurate, meager, or erroneous" but
is expressed in a manner that would put a subsequent purchaser on
inquiry notice of a more specific description, the purchaser is expected
to be aware of all information that would be obtained through further
inquiry.127
More recently, in Deljoo v. SunYrust Mortgage, Inc., 2 8 the Georgia
Supreme Court addressed whether a duly recorded security deed was
outside a parcel's chain of title when the deed's legal description
misidentified the land lot number but referenced a subdivision plat that
accurately identified the property.2 The security deed at issue was

120. Talmadge Bros. & Co. v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Ga. 550, 553, 31 S.E.
618, 618 (1898).
121. 105 Ga. 550, 31 S.E. 618 (1898).
122. GEORGIA CODE of 1895 § 3933 (1896), availableat http://digitalcommons.law.uga.
edulgascode/28/ ("Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry is notice
of everything to which it is afterwards found such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a
fact, due to negligence, is equivalent to knowledge in fixing the rights of parties.").
123. Talmadge Bros. & Co., 105 Ga. at 553, 31 S.E. at 618.
124. Id. at 554, 31 S.E. at 618.
125. Id. at 554-55, 31 S.E. at 619.
126. Id. at 554, 31 S.E. at 619.
127. Id. ("The object of the registry acts is to enable purchasers to obtain accurate
information respecting the title of any particular piece of land, and to accomplish this
purpose it is essential that the description of the land in the conveyance should be
reasonably certain and sufficient to enable subsequent purchasers to identify the premises
intended to be conveyed; but, while the description may be inaccurate, meager or
erroneous, yet if it is expressed in such a manner or connected with such attendant
circumstances as that a purchaser should be deemed to be put upon inquiry, ... he is
chargeable with all the notice he might have obtained had he done so.").
128. 284 Ga. 438, 668 S.E.2d 245 (2008).
129. Id. at 438, 668 S.E.2d at 246.
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filed of record, but a title examination performed for a subsequent
purchaser of the parcel did not uncover the deed because it mistakenly
designated the property as being in Land Lot 18 instead of Land Lot
28.130 However, the deed also specified and incorporated a page in a
plat book describing the subdivision in the DeKalb County records.'
Applying Talmadge, the supreme court determined that the deed's
reference to the plat book and page number in the legal description
incorporated the information on that page into the deed as if it were
written out in the deed itself.'a Thus, the title examiner was put on
inquiry notice of the contents of that page of the plat book and was put
on constructive notice of all other deeds it referenced.133
IV.

COURT's RATIONALE

Against this backdrop, a unanimous Georgia Supreme Court answered
the certified questions posed by the Eleventh Circuit in Gordon II.'
The supreme court concluded that a security deed lacking the signature
of an unofficial witness is not "duly filed, recorded, and indexed," even
if the deed appears in the county registry; thus, such a deed does not
provide constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers."' The
court also held that a witnessed waiver filed with a security deed is not
sufficient to put subsequent bona fide purchasers on inquiry notice of the
deed.'36
A. Whether a Security Deed That is Not Signed by an Unofficial
Witness Provides Constructive Notice to a Subsequent Bona Fide
Purchaser
Under Georgia law, a security deed must be attested to 37 or acknowledged by both an official and an unofficial witness before it may
be "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" in the county land records, where
it places subsequent bona fide purchasers on constructive notice of its
existence.3 s Wells Fargo argued that the security deed at issue was
130. Id. at 439, 668 S.E.2d at 246.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 440, 668 S.E.2d at 246-47.
133. Id. at 440, 668 S.E.2d at 247.
134. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 474, 749 S.E.2d at 369. See supra note 24.
135. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat' Ass'n, 289
Ga. at 15, 709 S.E.2d at 261) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 477-78, 749 S.E.2d at 371.
137. See Wood v. Davis, 161 Ga. 690, 694, 131 S.E. 885, 887 (1926) (holding that
"[a]ttestation is the act of witnessing the actual execution of the paper" because the witness
must see the maker sign the document to know that the signature is genuine).
138. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-33, -61 (2002).
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entitled to be recorded because the properly attested waiver, which
incorporated itself into the security deed, rendered the deed properly
attested as well.' 3 ' The court was not persuaded.4 o Citing its recent holding in United States Bank National Ass'n that the only deeds
eligible for recording are those meeting all statutory requirements,14 1
the court reiterated that only a properly attested security deed will serve
as constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers."' Thus, the
security deed at issue was not eligible for recording and consequently did
not provide constructive notice. 4 3 Even though it appears in the
county deed registry, the deed was technically never recorded because
it was not properly attested.'"
Adopting the reasoning from In re Fleernan, the court held that the
unofficial witness's signature on the waiver only verifies that the waiver
was executed by the signatories; the signature does not verify execution
of the security deed to which the waiver refers.4 4 Because the purpose
of the attestation requirement is the witnesses' confirmation that the
signatories themselves executed the document, allowing the waiver's
attestation to apply to the security deed as well would be "false and
contrary to the purpose of attestation."'4 6 To hold otherwise would
only lead to more complications for all parties-lenders, debtors, and
subsequent purchasers. 4 1 The court repeated its admonition from
United States Bank National Ass'n that lenders should protect their
property interests by carefully reviewing documents for statutory
compliance before submitting them for recording."
B. Whether a Security Deed That is Not Signed by an Unofficial
Witness Puts a Subsequent Bona Fide Purchaseron Inquiry Notice
Wells Fargo also argued that the fully executed, attested, and recorded
waiver was sufficient to put a subsequent bona fide purchaser on inquiry
notice of the security deed's existence in the chain of title.'49 It
contended that even if the security deed was not technically recorded in

139. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 476, 749 S.E.2d at 370.
140. Id.
141. U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n, 289 Ga. at 15, 709 S.E.2d at 261.
142. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 370.
143. See Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 24, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon, 292
Ga. 474, 749 S.E.2d 368 (2013) (No. S12Q2067).
144. See id.
145. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 476, 749 S.E.2d at 370.
146. Id. at 476-77, 749 S.E.2d at 370.
147. Id. at 477, 749 S.E.2d at 370.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 477, 749 S.E.2d at 371.
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the registry, anyone who checked the property's title in an attempt to
purchase the parcel from Codrington would have seen the deed in the
registry and would accordingly be on inquiry notice of Wells Fargo's
potential interest in the property.5 o However, the waiver did not
include a description of the property; it simply referenced an unidentified security deed, the names of the borrowers, and the lender."5 '
Thus, relying on Deljoo,152 the court ruled that the waiver would not
put a subsequent bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice that the property
may be encumbered by a security deed because the property description
Consequently, the court
in the waiver itself was inadequate.sa
answered the second question in the negative as well.' 54
V.

IMPLICATIONS

By demanding strict adherence to the recording system's requirements,
the Georgia Supreme Court aims to preserve the system's integrity and
decrease fraud."' Thus, careful attention to statutory requirements
for attestation will become more crucial than ever in the wake of the
decision in GordonIII. The court has clearly drawn a bright-line rule-a
no-tolerance policy for clerical errors in attestation that have not been
cured by recording a remedial affidavit in the chain of title."' Should
a debtor file for bankruptcy, the court has established that bankruptcy
trustees may use their strong-arm power to avoid a deed that has not

150. Brief for Respondent-Appellee, supra note 144, at 23.
151. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 477-78, 749 S.E.2d at 371. The court clarified what
constitutes the "security deed" that is turned over to the clerk of court for filing for
purposes of recording in the State of Georgia when it distinguished the security deed from
accompanying riders. Id. at 476, 749 S.E.2d at 370. This is an important interpretation
after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re Hong Ju Kim clearly
considered the security deed and all of the riders filed with it to comprise one document.
See supra text accompanying note 101. Generally, the deed and all of its exhibits, riders,
and other attachments are given to the clerk in one packet, and everything is filed
together. PINDAR & HINKEL, supra note 27, at § 19:126. The only way to search for the
properly attested waiver would be to locate the entry for the security deed in the grantor
or grantee index, look up the deed in the book and page number referenced for the security
deed, and find the waiver filed in the pages following the deed. It is not indexed separately.
See generally id. at § 26:21.
152. 284 Ga. at 439-40, 668 S.E.2d at 246.
153. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 478, 749 S.E.2d at 371.

154. Id.
155. See Leeds Bldg. Prods.Inc., 267 Ga. at 302, 477 S.E.2d at 568.
156. See O.C.G.A. § 44-2-20 (2010). An ideal solution would be a curative affidavit
signed by the grantor and attested by an official and unofficial witness. Gordon & Holbein,
supra note 44, at 7. The affidavit should identify the grantor, the grantee, and the
property, as well as indicate the deed book and page number where the improperly attested
deed can be found. Id.
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been executed precisely according to statutory requirements for
attestation because such a deed does not provide constructive notice.'
Because it is too late for an unsecured creditor to remedy errors once a
debtor files for bankruptcy, ensuring statutory compliance prior to
recordation is essential to maintaining a creditor's priority in the event
This ruling is in line with
that the debtor files for bankruptcy.'
settled case law holding that patently defective security deeds do not
provide constructive notice. 59
In light of this inevitable outcome, holders of patently defective
security deeds should stop engaging in prolonged litigation in a futile
attempt to prevent trustees from avoiding their deeds.6 o Because
administrative expenses are paid from the estate before unsecured
creditors receive their portion of the liquidated assets, by choosing not
to litigate, an unsecured creditor preserves a larger percentage of the
proceeds from the liquidated estate, which ultimately leaves more money
available for dispersal to unsecured creditors.16' When the trustee
successfully avoids the defective security deed, the deed holder will be
the largest unsecured creditor, thus receiving the largest portion of the
liquidated estate.'62
While the decision in Gordon III should encourage creditors to take
extra care to ensure statutory compliance for recordation so that their
interest will be secure in the event of a debtor's future bankruptcy, its
consequences might encourage negligence in other aspects of bankruptcy
or foreclosure proceedings. Equitable subrogation is one area where
Generally, the priority of a security
negligence may be rewarded.'
deed as against other encumbrances is dictated by the chronological
order of creation-earlier deeds outrank later ones." When a new
lender satisfies an existing debt on behalf of a borrower, the doctrine of
equitable subrogation operates to give the original creditor's rights to the

157. Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 478, 749 S.E.2d at 370, 371.
158. Gordon & Holbein, supra note 44, at 12. In fact, any remedies filed within 90 days
of the bankruptcy may also be avoided as a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4Xa)
(2012). Gordon & Holbein, supra note 44, at 12 n.32.
159. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 289 Ga. at 13, 709 S.E.2d at 260; Donalson v.
Thomason, 137 Ga. 848, 850, 74 S.E. 762, 763 (1912). In Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., the
supreme court ruled that security deeds with latent defects would provide constructive
notice, but it also confirmed its earlier decision in Higdon that patently defective deeds
could not be "duly" recorded. Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 267 Ga. at 302, 477 S.E.2d at 568.
160. Gordon & Holbein, supra note 44, at 12.
161. See id. Administrative expenses will be paid out of the estate ahead of the money
paid to unsecured creditors. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2012).
162. Gordon & Holbein, supra note 44, at 12.
163. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
164. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-323 (2002).
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new lender for the purposes of priority."' So long as an intervening
lien holder will not suffer prejudice and the new creditor has not been
negligent, equitable subrogation allows the cancellation of a prior
security deed to be set aside and revives the deed for the party who
satisfied it.166
For example, if a refinancing debtor has a first priority security deed
on his property and a second priority home equity line of credit
(HELOC), a new lender can pay the existing debts to cancel them, and
the new lender's security deed should become the first priority encumbrance on the property.'"' However, under Gordon III, if the original
security deed was not properly attested and thus does not provide
constructive notice, and if the HELOC remains open, the question
becomes whether the new security deed will have priority over the
HELOC if the HELOC lender did not have actual notice of the original
security deed.'
The subrogation did not decrease the HELOC
lender's rights because its encumbrance had a lower priority than the
original security deed that the new lender satisfied, so the HELOC
should remain a second priority encumbrance.169 However, if the
HELOC lender was not aware of the prior security deed because the
lender did not check the title on the property before extending the line
of credit, and the lender was not on constructive notice of the security
deed due to improper attestation, the lender may have an argument for
first priority.'
Thus, it may behoove second priority lenders to check
for patent defects on first priority loans if the holding in Gordon III

165. Ogier v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Phillips), 465 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2012). See also Davis v. Johnson, 241 Ga. 436, 438, 246 S.E.2d 297, 299-300 (1978)
("Where one advances money to pay off an encumbrance on realty either at the instance
of the owner of the property or the holder of the encumbrance, either upon the express
understanding or under circumstances under which an understanding will be implied that
the advance made is to be secured by the senior lien on the property, in the event the new
security is for any reason not a first lien on the property, the holder of the security, if not
chargeable with culpable or inexcusable neglect, will be subrogated to the rights of the
prior encumbrancer under the security held by him, unless the superior or equal equity of
others would be prejudiced thereby."). Equitable subrogation has been recognized in
Georgia as early as 1898. Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank v. Tillman, 106 Ga. 55, 57, 31
S.E. 794, 795 (1898). When equitable subrogation operates, the new lender, or subrogee,
cannot be given greater rights than the original creditor. In re Phillips,465 B.R. at 339.
166. In re Phillips,465 B.R. at 339.
167. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. See infra note 176.
169. Flournoy Plumbing Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 181 Ga. 459,461-62, 182 S.E.
507, 508 (1935).
170. See Gordon III, 292 Ga. at 475, 749 S.E.2d at 370.
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means that second priority lenders may claim first priority for lack of
constructive notice of the first loan.
Another example of a situation in which negligence may be rewarded
could come in the form of property owners who grant an easement across
their land or sell a portion of their land to their neighbors. Suppose the
property is encumbered by a patently defective security deed that
nonetheless appears in the county deed registry. If the neighbors do not
check the title to the land before purchasing the parcel or taking the
easement, they would not be on actual notice of the security deed.
Ordinarily, the neighbors would be on constructive notice of the deed
because it appears in the deed book, rendering their claim subordinate
to that of the first priority security deed holder in the event of foreclosure.171 However, if the holder of the patently defective deed forecloses
and the neighbors are not on constructive notice, the neighbors' claims
to the land may be superior to the lender's because they had no notice
of the prior claim, and thus did not know that the property was subject
to any encumbrance."' Georgia is a race-notice state, so if the neighbors record a perfected deed or easement first, it should take priority
because the original security deed was not technically recorded. 171
Of course, whether a deed is properly recorded is a moot point if a
party is on actual notice of a deed." Seeing the defective deed in the
deed book suffices for actual notice.17 ' A person with actual notice of
a defective security deed is on inquiry notice to find out more about the

171. See O.C.GA. § 44-14-323.
172. See PINDAR & HINKEL, supra note 27, at § 19:124 n.1 (citations omitted)
("Improperly recorded instruments are not constructive notice and a purchaser without
notice of some adverse recording may protect himself by carefully analyzing the recording
for strict compliance with the statutes. (1) Is it an instrument entitled to record? The
original Act refers only to 'every deed conveying lands' (O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1), but other
instruments, such as sales contracts (O.C.G.A. § 44-2-6) and plats (O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67),
have been added. (2) Does the statute make the particular type of instrument constructive
notice?. . . (3) Have the requirements for attestation and acknowledgement been met? It
might even be shown that the notary was of too close kin to one of the parties, failed to
impress his seal, acted outside his jurisdiction, acted after expiration of his appointment,
or failed to actually see or take an acknowledgement of the signature.").
173. See O.C.G.A. § 44-2-1.
174. See generally Cowdery v. Greenlee, 126 Ga. 786, 55 S.E. 918 (1906) (noting that
the deed is still valid between the parties, regardless of whether it is recorded, even though
defective attestation may not furnish marketable title).
175. See generally Gardner v. E.C. Granniss, 57 Ga. 539 (1876) (stating that a
purchaser or attorney who actually sees a deed in the county registry is on actual notice,
regardless of whether the deed was eligible for recording); see also Page v. Will McKnight
Constr., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 571, 572, 639 S.E.2d 381, 383 (2006) ("[A] purchaser who has
actual notice of a prior instrument does not have priority over a subsequent purchaser,
even if that prior instrument is unrecorded or defectively recorded.").

2014]

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

1223

deed and its validity, and constructive notice of the deed no longer
matters."' However, if purchasers do not check the title as they
should before entering into a contract for the sale of property rights, 7
this negligence means that they would not be on actual notice of the
deed and thus not on inquiry notice, and the security deed's patent
defect eliminates constructive notice. 71 Consequently, a negligent
purchaser may have a superior claim to title. Accordingly, the decision
in Gordon III rewards parties who do not do their due diligence before
entering into an agreement to purchase property rights, and, therefore,
it may have the unintended consequence of encouraging negligence or
even willful blindness.
LESLEY RowE

176. O.C.G.A. § 23-1-17; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text. Interestingly,
inquiry notice usually leads to actual notice instead of actual notice leading to inquiry
notice.
177. See, e.g., Talmadge Bros. & Co., 105 Ga. at 553-54,31 S.E. at 618 ("It is presumed
that a purchaser has examined every deed and instrument affecting the title.").
178. Gordon III, 292 Ga. 474, 475, 749 S.E.2d 368, 370.
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